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Abstract - F/OSS software has been described by many as a puzzle. In the past five 
years, it has stimulated the curiosity of scholars in a variety of fields, including 
economics, law, psychology, anthropology and computer science, so that the number of 
contributions on the subject has increased exponentially. The purpose of this paper is to 
provide a sufficiently comprehensive account of these contributions in order to draw 
some general conclusions on the state of our understanding of the phenomenon and 
identify directions for future research. The exercise suggests that what is puzzling about 
F/OSS is not so much the fact that people freely contribute to a good they make 
available to all, but rather the complexity of its institutional structure and its ability to 
organizationally evolve over time.  
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Maria Alessandra Rossi, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Siena1.  A brief introduction to F/OSS software development: is there 
an “F/OSS puzzle” to be decoded? 
 
In the early days of the free/open source (F/OSS) phenomenon neither its 
proponents nor its opponents could imagine its subsequent success. In a 1976 “open 
letter to hobbyists” Bill Gates wrote: “Who can afford to do professional work for 
nothing? what hobbyist can put three man-years into programming, finding all bugs, 
documenting his product, and distribute for free?” (Moody, 2001). Later on Linus 
Torvalds, the father of the popular F/OSS operating system Linux, has frequently 
acknowledged his surprise at the extraordinary participation Linux has been able to 
attract over time (Diamonds and Torvalds, 2001). At present, Linux is successfully 
competing with Windows, the Apache HTTP server runs over 67 per cent of the world’s 
websites as of November 2003 (Netcraft, 2003) and many more F/OSS projects are 
widely adopted (Perl, Sendmail, FreeSBD, Mozilla, GCC etc.). Moreover, many 
governments around the world have endorsed to various extents F/OSS software, 
especially Linux.  
The defining characteristics of F/OSS   are a) the free availability of its source code, 
namely of the human-readable instructions that compose a given program, and b) the 
nature of the license under which it is distributed, which allows both its free 
modification and its free redistribution. This distinguishes F/OSS not only from 
proprietary software, distributed in object-code form under a license that sets clear 
restrictions to its usage and requires payment of a fee, but also from freeware and 
shareware, that can both be downloaded free of charge but do not allow access to the 
source code. The combination of the mentioned characteristics allows a scattered group 
of developers to modify existing programs and redistribute them. 
The number of contributions exploring the phenomenon has increased exponentially 
in the past five years. The purpose of this paper is to provide a sufficiently 
comprehensive account of these contributions in order to draw some general 
conclusions on the state of our understanding of the phenomenon and identify directions 
for future research. Partly as a consequence of the fact that some F/OSS enthusiasts 
have portrayed the F/OSS world as a world from which homo oeconomicus has been 
banned, the dominant question addressed in the literature has been whether the 
F/OSSphenomenon represents a puzzle for economic theory or can be accommodated 
into a standard economic framework. This question will not be crucial to the paper. 
There are good reasons to believe that what is puzzling about F/OSSis not so much the 
fact that people freely contribute to a good they make available to all, but rather the 
complexity of its institutional structure and its ability to organizationally evolve over 
time. For one thing, in the early days of software programming, free distribution of 
source code was taken for granted and the cultural frame in which software 
development took place was akin to the realm of “Open Science” described by 
Dasgupta and David (1994). 
The paper is organized as follows: in section two the various hypotheses advanced 
to explain voluntary contributions to F/OSSprojects will be reviewed in light of the 
empirical evidence available, whereas the focus of section three will be on papers 
dealing with the governance of F/OSSprojects. Section four will broaden the 
perspective so as to look at the competitive and cooperative relationships of F/OSS 
communities with commercial actors. In section five the main questions raised by the   2
F/OSS development model in relation to intellectual property rights will be addressed. 
Section six will take up the issue of the rationale for government support of F/OSS 
projects. Section seven concludes.  
 
2.  What motivates contributions to F/OSS projects?  
 
Among the many questions raised by OSS, that concerning individual incentives and 
motivations has received by far the greatest attention. Scholarly contributions on this 
matter tend to reflect authors’ personal conception of human nature and their beliefs 
about the interpretive power of particular theories of social interaction, with the result 
that the heterogeneity of the phenomenon has generally been downplayed. Not only 
F/OSS projects differ significantly from one another in terms of the complexity of the 
software developed, its degree of modularity, the nature of coordination or the intensity 
of communication among the various contributors, just to cite few relevant dimensions 
of the heterogeneity,  but within the same project participants differ as regards the 
intensity of their contributions, the primary motivation for contributing, the level of 
ideological commitment etc. It is thus unlikely that one-sided interpretations of the 
motivation leading to contribute to F/OSS software development could capture a 
sufficient degree of such heterogeneity. Luckily enough, the growing number of 
empirical explorations of the F/OSS phenomenon can provide an efficient check on the 
powerfulness of the various explanatory variables proposed. 
In what follows a significant number of scholarly contributions on the issue of F/OSS 
developers’ motivation will be reviewed, following an expositional scheme that has 
come to be widely accepted in the literature (Hars and Ou, 2001; Osteloh, 2002; 
Lakhani and Wolf, 2003). According to this scheme, individual motivations can be 
grouped under two broad headings: intrinsic and extrinsic. Extrinsic motivations belong 
to the realm of “off-the-shelf” economic theory and relate to the immediate or delayed 
benefits accruing to the individual in a mediated form, in general through monetary 
compensation. Intrinsic motivation differs from extrinsic motivation primarily because 
it is valued per se. As Ryan and Deci (2000) put it: “Intrinsic motivation is defined as 
the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable 
consequence. When intrinsically motivated, a person is moved to act for the fun or 
challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures or rewards”
1. 
Lindenberg (2001) has proposed a further distinction between enjoyment-based intrinsic 
motivation, which is closer to the previous definition, and obligation/community-based 
intrinsic motivation that refers to the intrinsic benefits that may be associated to 
adherence to social or community norms.  
                                                 
1 Essential components of intrinsic motivation are in general assumed to be a) self-determination (Deci, 
1980) and autonomy, stemming from the individual’s perception of freedom, identity, responsibility, and 
control and b) competence, which is positively related to intrinsic motivation to the extent that the task at 
hand is neither far within nor far beyond the individual’s level of competence (Deci and Ryan, 1985). 
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2.1.  Extrinsic motivations: reputation, user needs, learning and 
performance improvement. 
One of the most powerful accounts of the role played by extrinsic motivation in 
explaining contributions to F/OSS projects is surely Lerner and Tirole’s (2002) article. 
The two authors posit that “a programmer participates in a project, whether 
commercial or F/OSS, only if she derives a net benefit (broadly defined) from engaging 
in the activity. The net benefit is equal to the immediate payoff (current benefits minus 
current costs) plus the delayed payoff (delayed benefits minus delayed costs)” and 
derive that the F/OSS phenomenon can be (almost entirely) reconciled with standard 
economic arguments.  
Lerner and Tirole’s argument is, indeed, persuasive, and firmly grounded on some 
empirical facts relevant in the context of OS software. Their focus is on two aspects of 
F/OSS development: a) the immediate benefits obtained by oss developers in 
“scratching an itch”, namely solving a problem they face and b) the existence of a 
“signalling incentive” that derives from the gratification associated to peer recognition 
or from delayed benefits in the form of better job offers relative to non-F/OSS 
developers. 
Lerner and Tirole’s main line of argument is thus that once the above mentioned 
immediate and delayed benefits are factored in an individual developer’s cost-benefit 
calculation, voluntary contributions are not as startling as it might first appear. Indeed, 
the F/OSS environment represents in many respects a better context than proprietary 
settings for the reputational mechanism to display its effects. The costs incurred to build 
up a reputation (including both the effort spent and the opportunity cost of forgone 
monetary compensation or of not focusing on one’s primary mission) might be lowered 
by a) the “alumni effect”, i.e. familiarity with the programming language due to the fact 
that programs available for free are often used as teaching tools in schools and 
universities; b) the private benefit of getting a bug fixed or solving another 
programming problem and c) the enjoyment inherent in a challenging and/or just fun 
activity. As for the benefits, the authors stress that F/OSS projects fulfill the main 
requirements spelled out in the literature on signaling incentives (Holmstrom, 1999). 
Compared to closed source projects, F/OSS software development has a number of 
advantages in that a) the openness of the source code allows better performance 
measurement and increases the visibility of one’s own contribution to the relevant 
audience; b) each programmer is fully responsible for her contribution, so that the 
source code available to anyone for inspection more directly reflects her talent; and c) 
the labor market is more fluid (for a formal model very much in the spirit of Lerner and 
Tirole’s contribution, see Lee, Mosa and Weiss (2003)). 
As subsequent academic commentary has emphasized, proponents of the “signaling 
incentive” argument tell us only part of the F/OSS story, for as much as the reputation 
mechanism might be important to the F/OSS community, it does not provide an 
adequate explanation to some relevant empirical facts. First, the characteristics of 
F/OSS projects indeed allow developers joining them to gain benefits in terms of 
reputation and may explain partly or even fully the reason for joining an existing 
project. What the reputation argument does not make clear is why would a “top-notch 
programmer” decide to initiate a project in the first place by rendering freely available   4
on the web code that might have significant commercial value if taken private
2. Linus 
Torvalds, the initiator of one of the most successful F/OSS projects (Linux) was not 
primarily motivated by reputation concerns, but rather from a desire to participate in a 
community he identified with (Diamond and Torvalds, 2001). Suspects are legitimate 
that there might be more to F/OSS communities than simply reputation-sustaining 
devices.  
Second, as Steve Weber (2000) points out
3, if reputation were the primary driver of 
contributions, we would probably observe significantly more direct challenges to 
project leaders’ authority and more “strategic forking”, namely more deviations from 
the main development path motivated by ambition for leadership. After all, reputation 
and leadership are positional goods (Hirsch, 1976), which entails that in a given 
community at any point of time aggregate consumption of such goods is equal to zero, 
so that their enjoyment is affected by whether or not other people consume them in 
positive amounts (see also Pagano, 1999 and 2002). In other words, not all Linux 
contributors will be leaders and/or will be able to enjoy good reputations. Indeed, a 
closer look at day-to-day operation of F/OSS communities shows that forking is a rare 
event and that “there is strong social pressure against forking projects. It does not 
happen except under plea of dire necessity, with much public justification, and with a 
renaming”(Raymond, 1999b). 
Third, the hierarchical structure of many F/OSS projects casts additional doubts on 
the dominance of reputation-related motives on programmers’ decision to contribute to 
F/OSS development (McGowan, 2002). This is because the extent to which each 
programmer will be able to reap reputational benefits depends crucially on the project 
maintainer’s discretional decision, given a hierarchical allocation of decisional power as 
regards the choice of what pieces of source code should be incorporated into the official 
release of a program.  
Fourth, and most importantly, empirical analyses of the F/OSS community have 
made available information that counters the reputation-maximizing story. One piece of 
empirical evidence shows that a wide majority of participants to F/OSS projects does 
not even actually contribute code, but rather comments and descriptions of the 
applications (Dempsey et al. 1999), which is hard to consider the best activity to choose 
if one is willing to engage in reputation-gaining exhibition of skilfulness. Hann et al.’s 
(2002) study of three F/OSS projects under the control of the Apache Software 
Foundation obtains somewhat ambiguous result. On one side, they reject the hypothesis 
of a positive correlation between greater participation to the projects (as measured by 
the number of contributions made) and wage increases. On the other side, they find a 
positive correlation between status in the Apache community and wages
4. Although this 
second result can be interpreted as consistent with the “signalling incentive” theory, as 
the authors do, the two results taken together do not lead to a straightforward 
conclusion. In fact, one might still wonder why would the average contributor put any 
                                                 
2 Lerner and Tirole (2002, p.215) briefly address this issue, but focus only on the case in which the 
releaser of the original source code is employed by a corporation and is prevented by the latter from 
taking the code private.  
3 This point is also made by McGowan (2002, p.39). 
4 This result may be biased because of the history of the Apache Software Foundation, initiated by 
professionals who still enjoy a high status in the Apache community and who are likely to earn high 
wages quite independently from their participation in the ASF activities.  
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effort into F/OSS project if her principal concern was to build up her reputation and her 
level of contribution did not matter to that end. 
Finally, the numbers reported by all the empirical analyses to date (Gosh et al., 
2001; Hars and Ou, 2001; Hertel et al. 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2001) suggest that 
reputation per se is by no means the most prominent motive for contributing to F/OSS 
projects. Although these findings may reflect to some extent contributors’ self-
assessment biases, they should not be dismissed too quickly. 
Another driver of voluntary contributions to F/OSS projects pertaining to the 
category of extrinsic motivations is the already mentioned purpose of “scratching an 
itch”, namely fixing a bug or solving a problem of immediate relevance to the 
programmer. User needs indeed constitute a powerful incentive to create the software 
code in the first place and, given the low costs associated to the act of making the code 
available through a means as powerful as the web, the decision to distribute it for free 
may not appear particularly startling. The existence of “horizontal user-only innovation 
networks” (von Hippel, 2002)
5, innovation by lead users, and free revelation of details 
of the innovation to manufacturers or even to other users has been documented in a 
variety of fields (see for example Allen, 1983; von Hippel,1988; Morrison et al, 2000) 
6.  
In general, free revelation of innovations will occur if the benefits associated to it 
outweigh its costs. In the specific case of F/OSS development, costs of diffusion are 
kept down by the availability of an efficient communication technology, i.e. the internet 
(Kollock, 1999), whereas opportunity costs might be sufficiently low at least for some 
of the heterogeneous participants to the F/OSS community. Indeed, as reported by 
empirical investigations of the demographic of F/OSS development (see for instance 
Gosh et al., 2001), a significant fraction of the contributors to F/OSS projects is made 
up by students who typically do not regard potential adopters of their innovation as 
rivals. As for the benefits associated to diffusion, at least two forces are at work: one is 
a standard network effect according to which users of a given operating system or 
application benefit from the expansion of the user base; the second is the increase in the 
number of programmers that can be more directly useful to the original innovator by 
reporting bugs and making additions to the source code (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; von 
Krogh, 1998 and 2002).  
User needs may explain not only why developers contribute source code, but also 
why uninteresting and mundane tasks such as providing documentation or support to 
users are efficiently performed, although they are neither appreciated per se, for the 
intrinsic pleasure and enjoyment a programmer may derive from them, nor can convey a 
significant signal of the programmer’s ability. Lakhani and Von Hippel (2003) address 
exactly this issue, empirically analysing the online help system for Apache. Their main 
finding is that the surprising degree of effectiveness of the voluntary online support for 
                                                 
5 According to von Hippel (2002), “User innovation networks can function entirely independently of 
manufacturers when (1) at least some users have sufficient incentive to innovate, (2) at least some users 
have an incentive to voluntarily reveal their innovations, and (3) diffusion of innovations by users is low 
cost and can compete with commercial production and distribution.” 
6 In a more general context than that of F/OSS context, the following incentives have been pointed out as 
conducive to free revelation of innovations to other users and/or to manufacturers (Harhoff, Henkel, von 
Hippel, 2000): a) inducing manufacturers improvement; b) setting a standard advantageous to the user 
innovator; c) reciprocity and reputation effects; d) low rivalry conditions.  
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users depends on the opportunity for learning valuable information such activity offers 
to providers, through  the public posting of answers and questions.  
Note that an important aspect of the explanation of the motivation to contribute to 
F/OSS projects in terms of the need to satisfy particular user needs that has been 
overlooked so far is the heterogeneity of such needs. Were user needs homogeneous, we 
could expect F/OSS development to resemble a waiting game much more than 
empirical observation allows us to. Heterogeneity of user needs ensures that the 
probability of being able to free ride on the contribution of other developers for a 
specific piece of code is sufficiently low that a programmer may find it worthwhile to 
develop it by herself (Bessen, 2001)
7. 
What is the empirical relevance of user needs as a motivation to participate in F/OSS 
communities? Lakhani and Wolf (2003) in a web-based survey administered to 684 
software developers in 287 F/OSS projects find user needs, both work- and non-work-
related, to be the overwhelming reason for contribution and participation
8. Gosh et al. 
(2002) in the so-called FLOSS survey also find a significant percentage of respondents 
indicating motivations that can be associated to the category of user needs. Similarly, 
Hertel et al. (2003) find a pragmatic interest in personal advantages associated to 
improving the functionality of the Linux kernel to be a relevant motive for contributing 
and to be positively correlated with the intensity of the development effort
9.  
However, one should be cautious in concluding that satisfaction of user needs per se 
represents an adequate explanation for the significant amount of contribution to F/OSS 
projects that we currently observe. For one thing, the costs of contributing are in fact not 
as trivial as it might first appear, as publication of code on the internet requires time-
consuming publication of the relevant documentation as well. In addition to this, if the 
mentioned empirical results are put in perspective and the relevance of user needs-
related motivations is considered relative to the other motivations indicated, the picture 
is much less clear-cut. Indeed, Lankhani and Wolf (2003) conclude that “the F/OSS 
community has heterogeneous motives to participate and contribute. Individuals may 
join for a variety of reasons, and no one reason tends to dominate the community or 
cause people to make distinct choices in beliefs.” Similarly, the FLOSS survey finds a 
number of motivations distinct from user needs to be relevant to the decision to join and 
to stay in the F/OSS community, a significant portion of which fares better in absolute 
terms than user needs
10. 
In sum, the empirical evidence available to date confirms that the pursuit of extrinsic 
rewards does play an appreciable role in motivating contributions to F/OSS 
                                                 
7 Franke and von Hippel (2003) focus on the heterogeneity of user needs in their study of the Apache 
Security Software, and propose the extension of the “innovation toolkit” approach adopted in the Apache 
Security functionality to other markets characterized by heterogeneous demand.  
8 The study, based on the Boston Consulting Group survey, finds work-related user needs to be relevant to 
33.8% of participants and non-work-related user needs to be relevant to 29,7% of participant, with only 
5% of respondents choosing both types of user needs as important.  
9 It should be mentioned, however, that both Gosh et al.(2002) and Hertel et al.(2003) studies address the 
question of the relevance of user needs less directly than Lakhani and Wolf’s study.  
10 The most prominent reported motive for participation is in fact to “learn and develop new 
skills”(78,9%), which is followed, interestingly, by more “social” motivations such as the desire to 
“participate in a new form of cooperation” (34,5%) and “share knowledge and skills”(49,7%), just to cite 
two of the more often reported motives.    7
development projects. Learning and performance improvement also tend to be ranked 
among the top reported motives for contributing in all the surveys reviewed (Gosh et al., 
2001; Hars and Ou, 2001; Hertel et al. 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2001), although they do 
not find an appreciable space in the theoretical literature. 
2.2.  Intrinsic motivations: hedonic motivations, altruism, generalized 
reciprocity and gift-giving attitude. 
Under the heading “intrinsic motivations” a variety of circumstances affecting the 
decision to contribute can be grouped, ranging from the pure pleasure of programming 
to more social-oriented motives such as the desire to participate in a collaborative 
activity or the idealistic convincement that software should be free.  
The fact that F/OSS contributors enjoy their programming activities is certainly out 
of doubt. The characteristics of F/OSS development processes create an environment 
that tends to be more suitable than proprietary settings to express one’s creativity, have 
fun and experience a sense of satisfaction and accomplishment. This is partly because of 
the greater freedom of experimentation in writing the code and partly because of greater 
autonomy in selecting projects that match one’s own skill level
11. Among the few 
theoretical contributions addressing the issue of enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation, 
the one that places greater emphasis on human creativity is Moglen’s (1999). Professor 
Moglen attributes to the dramatic decrease in the cost of global interconnection made 
possible by the Internet the expansion of the possibility of expression of human 
creativity that is ultimately responsible for the development of the “anarchic” F/OSS 
mode of production.  
The individual enjoyment of programming represents necessarily only part of the 
intrinsic motivation to contribute to F/OSS projects. Altruism might be an additional 
component, frequently mentioned by proponents of the F/OSS approach. While it is 
reasonable to ask why we should expect F/OSS developers to be more altruistic that 
others, the presence of a concern for increasing the welfare of others should not be ruled 
out altogether.  
Obligation and community-based intrinsic motivations constitute an additional 
element of the picture. Even casual observation of the working of F/OSS projects 
suggests the importance of implicit or explicit norms that define the “hacker identity”. 
The sense of community identification indeed pre-exists the popularity of F/OSS 
software, as the following quote from Linus Torvalds makes clear: 
 “…the act of making Linux available wasn’t some agonizing decision that I took from 
thinking long and hard on it: it was a natural decision within the community that I felt 
I wanted to be a part of.”(Torvalds, 1998) 
Obligation-based intrinsic motivations have been variously described as arising from 
generalized reciprocity, gift-giving culture, or a clearly defined sense of identification 
with the F/OSS community that may or may not entail the sharing of an explicit anti-
Microsoft attitude.  
Kollock (1999) applies to virtual communities the notion of generalized exchange 
developed by Ekeh (1974), suggesting that voluntary contribution of information to 
                                                 
11 Lakhani and Wolf (2001) indeed report that F/OSS developers enjoy flow states and loose track of time 
when working on F/OSS projects.   8
virtual networks is supported by an expectation of generalized reciprocity. Whereas 
anonymous interactions in the digital environment prevent direct reciprocation, it is 
possible for contributions to occur on the basis of the expectation that a balance might 
occur within the group as a whole (for a contrasting view, emphasizing the absence of 
any form of reciprocity, see Moglen, 1999).  
The culture of gift-giving has been often mentioned as an important characteristic of 
F/OSS communities (see Dang Nguyen and Pénard, 1999 for a perspective on gift-
giving in the internet more generally). Eric Raymond, one of the most active 
ethnographers of the F/OSS community, depicts the F/OSS culture as a gift culture in 
which economic scarcity is not an issue and social status is determined “not by what 
you control but by what you give away” (Raymond, 1999). Bergquist and Ljungberg 
(2001) and Zeitlyn (2003) subsequently specify the terms of Raymond’s analogy 
between gift-giving and contribution to F/OSS software. While differing in focus, both 
papers make explicit reference to the classic work of Mauss (1950) and thus 
acknowledge the fact that gift giving is associated to an obligation to reciprocate and 
creates social interdependencies. Bergquist and Ljungberg (2001) focus on the idea that 
gifts in F/OSS communities are at the origin of power relations based on reputation and 
make a parallel with peer review in academia. Zeitlyn (2003) also makes the point that 
gift-giving enhances reputation, but stresses the relevance of reputation for generosity as 
a means to accumulate “symbolic capital” in Bourdieu terms. What is perhaps 
understated in these accounts of the gift-giving culture of F/OSS communities is the role 
played by F/OSS licenses. The latter ensures that the gift given to the community cannot 
be privately appropriated and thus allows an indirect form of reciprocation to be 
sustained. Interpretations that emphasize the power-relations aspect of the gift-giving 
culture tend to miss this important point.  
If the characterization of the F/OSS milieu as a gift giving culture might be 
controversial
12, much less controversy exists around the fact that F/OSS developers 
demonstrate an appreciable sense of identification with their community. The extent to 
which the norms and values of the community are internalised differs across 
participants, with those who subscribe to the views of the Free Software Foundation
13 
being at the extreme of the spectrum of ideological commitment. A coherent set of 
norms, values and shared beliefs informs interactions in the F/OSS community, to the 
point that newcomers (“newbies”) are thought the basic principles of the F/OSS 
community culture before they actually start participating (Bergquist and Ljungberg, 
2001). Those principles can be (very roughly) summarized by mentioning a) the belief 
that software should be free; b)  the high value attached to a cooperative attitude and the 
sharing of information; c) appreciation for technical knowledge and high-quality source 
code; d) the importance of reputation among one’s peers; e) the importance of 
recognizing a developer’s valuable contribution of source code by giving it appropriate 
credit. A shared opposition to Microsoft and the desire to limit the power of large 
software companies more generally are not necessarily beliefs the whole community 
                                                 
12 For instance Weber (2000) rightly questions what is exactly to be considered abundant in the digital 
world besides bandwidth and computing power and suggests that, while the latter are devalued exactly 
because they are abundant, scarcity still dominates the domain of human creativity and brainpower.  
13 Advocates of the Foundation have a strong ideological commitment to the idea that software should be 
free, whereas proponents of the F/OSS Definition tend to have a more pragmatic approach and value free 
software mainly for the concrete benefits it offers (Feller and Fitzgerald, 2002).    9
ascribes to, although some commentators have stressed the role of perceived 
competition of OSS projects with commercial software companies as an important 
motivating factor (Bezroukov, 1999). 
Recognition of the existence of a shared set of normative, principled and causal 
beliefs informs the analyses of Kasper Edwards (2001) and Cohendet, Creplet and 
Dupouet (2001), that  propose a framework based on the combination of the theory of 
epistemic communities and the theory of situated learning and legitimate peripheral 
participation (Lave and Wenger, 1991) to understand the motivation of F/OSS 
developers (on the role of peripheral members in online communities see also Zhang 
and Storck, 2001). Ilkka Tuomi (2001) combines the theory of “communities of 
practice” with actor-network theory to understand participation to the Linux kernel. 
Other scholars have emphasized the similarities between F/OSS communities and a 
particular kind of epistemic communities, namely scientific communities (Bezroukov, 
1999; Raymond, 1999c; Kelty, 2001; David, Arora and Steinmuller, 2001). 
The relevance of the sense of identification with the community as a powerful driver 
of individual participation to F/OSS projects has been assessed by all of the empirical 
analyses of motivation realized so far (Gosh et al., 2001; Hars and Ou, 2001; Hertel et 
al. 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2001)
14. In Lakhani and Wolf’s (2003) study the 
components of obligation and community based motivation are highly ranked by 
participants
15. Similar results appear in the FLOSS survey (Gosh et al.2002)
16.  
Hertel et al.(2003) study contributions to the Linux kernel, and find that 
identification with the Linux  community has the strongest influence on participants 
engagement, together with the more pragmatic motive of improving own software and 
with tolerance of time investments. Moreover, 59% of their respondents indicated that 
they worked in teams. Analysis at the individual team level shows that 
“instrumentality”(i.e. the perceived importance or indispensability of one’s own 
contribution for the group outcome) and “valence” (i.e. the subjective evaluation of 
team goals) are the best predictors for time investment in F/OSS programming and 
willingness to engage in programming in the future, whereas perceived self-efficacy is 
the best predictor for performance (number of lines of code and “patches” contributed). 
As for the other aspects of intrinsic motivation, the mentioned empirical studies 
confirm their concrete relevance. Hars and Ou (2001) find what they call “self-
determination”, namely the feeling of accomplishment, competence, enjoyment and 
effectiveness, to be the second highest-rated motivation, relevant to 79.7% of 
respondents. Lakhani and Wolf (2003) find that enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation 
(the sense of creativity and intellectual stimulation experienced when working on the 
                                                 
14 One study, by Stewart and Gosain (2003), addresses directly the impact of trust and ideology on the 
effectiveness of team work in F/OSS communities finding a positive influence on team effectiveness of 
cognitive trust, which is in turn influenced by adherence to community norms. However, they do not find 
a direct relationship between adherence to community norms and team effectiveness.  
15 One third of respondents indicate for example that the “belief that source code should be open” was an 
important reason for participation. Self-identification with the hacker community was also confirmed by a 
42% of respondents indicating that they “strongly agree with hacker ethic” and another 41% indicating to 
“somewhat agree” with the statement that the hacker community is the primary source of their identity. 
16 What is interesting about the results of this study is that the decision to join the community and the 
decision to stay in the community are separately investigated, so that it is possible to get a feeling of the 
evolution of motivations over time. Obligation and community based motivations (“political” motivations 
in the language of the study) display a tendency to increase appreciably over time.    10
project) is the strongest and more pervasive factor
17. In addition to this, they also report 
the very interesting finding that, differently from the consistent results of previous 
studies on the negative impact of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation (Deci, 
Koestner and Ryan, 1999), being paid for participating to an F/OSS project does not 
crowd out individual motivation. Altruistic motivations are also found to be of some 
relevance
18.  
On balance, it is difficult to extract from the empirical literature a case for the 
prevalence of either intrinsic or extrinsic motivations in determining contributions to 
F/OSS projects. Hars and Ou (2001) conclude for the dominance of extrinsic 
motivations, although a look at the numbers they report questions such a clear-cut 
conclusion. The studies by Gosh et al.(2002) and Hertel et al.(2003) do not allow an 
easy comparison among extrinsic and intrinsic motives, whereas Lakhani and Wolf’s 
study concludes that the main driver of effort is given by enjoyment-based intrinsic 
motivation. It thus appears that the question whether one or the other category of 
motivations dominates the other is not as interesting as the question concerning how the 
different motives interact.  
The issue of the interplay between different motives has been addressed by Osteloch 
et al. (2002) and Frank and Jungwirth (2002). Osterloch et al. (2002) make a case on the 
complementarity between extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, describing F/OSS projects 
as instances in which a “tragedy of the commons” in innovation activities can be 
overcome without strong property rights and central authority because of the 
heterogeneous nature of participants’ motivation. In this interpretation, the contribution 
of intrinsically motivated developers they describe as “fun seekers” and/or “members of 
the tribe” is essential to get the project underway and to ensure attention by extrinsically 
motivated people such as “commercial players”, “lead users” or “reputation investors”.  
The complementarity among different motivations is also stressed by Frank and 
Jungwirth (2002). What characterizes F/OSS development is – according to the two 
authors – the crafting of an institutional structure that allows to reconcile the interests of 
“investors”, motivated exclusively by cost-benefit considerations, and “donators” acting 
out of idealistic motives. The distinction is perhaps a bit harsh, as both kinds of 
motivations are in general relevant to the same developer, but the focus of the paper is 
on the working of the institutional structure of F/OSS projects rather than on exploring 
extensively the nature of programmers’ motivations. Central to the disclosure-feedback 
approach adopted by F/OSS development is the GPL licence that, while sustaining a 
reputation-based incentive structure and acting as a “non-distribution constraint” akin to 
those relevant in the theory of non-profit organizations, does not crowd out investors 
interested in second-use and commercialization of F/OSS software.  
 
                                                 
17 In Hertel et al. (2003) survey enjoyment-based and community-based intrinsic motivations are more 
difficult to disaggregate, whereas Gosh et al. (2002) do not address directly the question of enjoyment-
based intrinsic motivations. 
18 They are important for instance to 16.5% of the developers surveyed in Hars and Ou’s (2001) 
study. The percentage increases, perhaps unsurprisingly, when results are disaggregated by programmer 
“type”, with the 24.2% of students and hobby programmers rating high on altruism.    11
3.  The governance of F/OSS projects 
 
F/OSS software development can be considered a success story not only in terms of 
the number of individuals it has attracted over time, but also in terms of its inherent 
characteristics, praised not only by its advocates (Raymond, 1998; Jorgensen, 2001; 
Neumann, 2000) but by rivals as well, as in Microsoft’s so-called “Halloween 
Document”(Valloppillil, 1998). F/OSS projects tend to be complex, and indeed the 
challenge associated to their complexity is part of the reason why they are able to attract 
competent and highly motivated developers, as discussed in the previous section. 
Moreover, F/OSS development seems to defeat the widely accepted assertion in 
software development that “adding manpower to a late software product makes it 
later”, also known as “Brooks’ law” (Brooks, 1975). Indeed, in contrast to Brooks’ law, 
the success of F/OSS development seems driven precisely by the high number of skilled 
developers that participate in it.  
Another issue that has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention concerns therefore the 
identification of the features of OS software that determine its success and, relatedly, 
the identification of the characteristics that distinguish it from proprietary development. 
In what follows this strand of the literature will be introduced by reporting the answers 
it has provided to three broad questions: what are the principal features of the “F/OSS 
production mode”? how are F/OSS projects coordinated? and, how is coordination 
sustained?. 
3.1.  What are the principal features of the “F/OSS production mode”? 
In a ground-breaking article Eric Raymond (1998) has characterized the internal 
organization of F/OSS projects (more specifically, of Linux) as a bazaar-style 
programming mode, as opposed to the cathedral-style organizational model adopted 
by commercial developers. The “bazaar” software development model relies on a 
number of fundamental principles, partly inherited from the tradition of Unix 
programming and partly evolved spontaneously along with the Linux software 
code. Raymond lists a great number of those principles, but for the purposes of the 
present discussion we deem it sufficient to mention the following (paraphrasing 
Raymond to some extent):  
▪  Avoid wasteful duplication of programming efforts by reusing existing 
software
19; 
▪  “Release early, release often. And listen to your customers”; 
▪  “Given a large enough beta-tester and co-developer base, almost every problem 
will be characterized quickly and the fix obvious to someone” (Linus’ law); 
▪  Exploit the distributed intelligence of the system by attaching high value to the 
users’ suggestions and by recognizing their good ideas. 
                                                 
19 Weber (2000) notes that this principle is strictly related to the adoption of F/OSS licenses that ensure 
programmers ongoing access to the source code and therefore softens the pressure to “reinvent the wheel” 
present under proprietary development.    12
The metaphor of the bazaar refers to a system of distributed innovation, involving 
large numbers of developers and characterized by a) the absence of a centralized 
decision-making unit defining ex-ante the direction of development of the software 
code; b) concurrent design and debugging; c) the integration of users into the production 
of software code; d) self-selection of programmers for the tasks that best match their 
abilities. 
As attention towards F/OSS software in general, and its governance structure in 
particular, has grown considerably, the stylised “cathedral-bazaar” metaphor has been 
increasingly perceived as inadequate to portrait the F/OSS development process. 
However, each of the mentioned characteristics identified more or less explicitly by 
Raymond (1998) has subsequently become the object of academic commentary.  
Point a and b are closely related. F/OSS development represents a process 
innovation (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003a; Mateos-Garcia and Steinmuller, 2003) among 
other things because it adopts on a very large scale a process of parallel development. 
Parallel development is enabled by the modularization of the source code
20. What this 
means is that single programs are assembled through the combination of relatively small 
and relatively independent components that can perform very complex functionalities in 
so far as they have effective communication interfaces. Modularity ensures that any 
change or addition to the source code belonging to a given module will have only 
limited or no reverberation on the rest of the system, thus allowing different developers 
to work on different components at the same time without fear of interference (on the 
implications of a modular architecture for the effectiveness of the F/OSS development 
model see also Baldwin and Clark, 2003)
21. Parallel development thus entails both an 
increase in programming speed and a potential increase in quality in circumstances in 
which different developers work in parallel on the same component (Feller and 
Fitzgerald, 2002). These benefits should be contrasted to the possibility that this last 
circumstance might entail wasteful duplication of effort, as only one of the solutions 
proposed will be incorporated into the official release of a given F/OSS product. 
However, one aspect of F/OSS development that might mitigate the mentioned 
efficiency loss is the “release early, release often” principle that implies that 
information about the availability of a given piece of software code reaches developers 
of potential alternative solutions early enough to assess the convenience of pursuing 
their development effort further.  
As for point b, Kogut and Methiu (2001) indicate in the concurrent process of design 
and debugging one of the two sources of efficiency gains associated to F/OSS 
development (the other being the integration of users into production). According to the 
two authors, proprietary software development tends to proceed at a pace determined by 
the least productive contributor, following a “weak link” chain production function. By 
contrast, F/OSS software development fully exploits the intelligence of the community 
and thus proceeds at a pace determined by the most productive m e m b e r  o f  t h e  
community.  
                                                 
20 Note that, while a modular structure characterizes most F/OSS projects, it is not a necessary condition 
of F/OSS development. One example of F/OSS project with a non-modular architecture – reported by 
Kim (2002) – is TouchGraph, a software component for visualizing networks of information.  
21 Note that Linus Torvalds attributes to the modularization of the software code the very success of 
Linux. (Torvalds, 1999).    13
The integration of users into the production of software code – point c – is a feature 
of F/OSS software that has been emphasized in a large number of contributions 
(Harhoff et al., 2000; Johnson, 2000; Kogut and Methiu, 2001; Bessen, 2002; Kuan, 
2002; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) provide a 
coherent framework for this issue, describing F/OSS as a private-collective model of 
innovation. F/OSS software development displays significant departures both from the 
private model of innovation (as typified by the development of proprietary software) 
and from the collective model of innovation.  
The key to understanding the effectiveness of the F/OSS production model – 
according to the two authors – is the fact that the outcome of the innovative process is 
not regarded as a pure public good, but possesses significant benefits that can be 
privately appropriable even if free revelation makes the innovation available to anyone 
who cares of making use of it. In this perspective, whereas free revelation of an 
innovation does not necessarily result in a loss of profit for its creator,  free-riders are 
not able to obtain exactly the same benefits from the innovation as those who have 
contributed to it. This, in turn, explains contributions to F/OSS projects entirely in terms 
of the private benefits they entail.  
 The implications of this characterization of F/OSS innovation for the governance of 
F/OSS projects are at least twofold. First, the relevance of contributions by users limits 
the need for monitoring and selective incentives to reduce free-riding. Second, 
differently from standard collective action settings, large groups of users-contributors 
are not necessarily less effective than small groups. To the contrary, whereas in general 
increases in group size encourage free riding and raise monitoring costs, in the case of 
F/OSS projects increasing the user-developer base positively affects developers’ 
incentives both because of network/compatibility effects and because each new 
participant is in effect a potential debugger/developer (Weber, 2000; von Hippel and 
von Krogh, 2002). It should be noted, however, that agreement on the latter point is not 
unanimous
22.  
Benkler (2001) expands upon the notion that programmers self-select for the tasks 
they are best at (point d), adopting it as a building block of a theory of “commons-based 
peer production” that stands in contrast to market-based and hierarchy-based 
production modes. He compares the three organizational modes along two principal 
dimensions: a) the effectiveness in elaborating human capital-related information; and 
b) the effectiveness in combining human capital and other resources. As for a, the 
relevant metrics for the comparison is the “information opportunity cost” entailed by 
the different production modes, namely the loss of information relative to an ideal state 
of perfect information. Peer production entails a lower “information opportunity cost” 
with respect to both markets and hierarchies because it does not require either the 
mediation of the price system or a standard contractual specification of the effort 
required (both difficult and imperfect because of the tacit nature of human capital) and 
allows individuals to self-identify for the tasks their human capital is best suited for. 
Given this process of self-identification, it is apparent that peer production will enjoy an 
                                                 
22 Foray and Zimmerman (2001), for instance, build a model of coalition in which as the number of 
agents who derive benefits from using or commercializing the software without contributing to it 
increases, the incentive system based on user needs, learning and reputation becomes increasingly 
difficult to sustain.  
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advantage with respect to the other two production modes also as regards the 
combination of human capital and other resources (point b). This is because it allows a 
relative unbounded set of agents to have access to an unbounded set of resources, 
without incurring the organizational or transaction costs entailed by markets and 
hierarchies, thus generating increasing returns to scale. The argument holds, however, 
provided that incentive problems can be solved at least as well in the peer production 
mode than in the hierarchy-based mode, which Benkler assumes to be generally the case 
when technology is sufficiently modular to require very small individual contributions. 
Both of these advantages are crucially important when the physical costs of information 
production and the costs of communication are low, so that the gains they afford 
outweigh the costs of coordination of widely distributed agents.  
3.2.  How are F/OSS projects coordinated?  
Empirical analyses aimed at providing a quantitative profile of F/OSS projects tend 
to be consistent in drawing a picture of the F/OSS community that contrasts with 
Raymond’s image of the bazaar. Departures from the “bazaar” model occur in two 
directions. On one side, there are studies supporting the notion of F/OSS software as 
mostly supported by “cave” rather than “community” development (Krishnamurty, 
2002). The principal finding of this category of studies is that the median number of 
developers per project is very low – four in Krishnamurthy’s study and as low as one in 
Healy and Schussman’s (2003) study. In addition to this, Krishnamurthy (2002) finds 
that the level of contact and communication within F/OSS communities tends to be 
low
23. On the other side, there are those studies that put into question the idea that 
community development takes place in a “flat network of interacting peers” each 
contributing to multiple projects (Healy and Schussman, 2003). Among the main 
findings of this category are the following: 
▪  Few developers account for most of the contributions (10% of the total number 
of contributors accounted for 72.3% of the total code base in the Orbiten Free 
Software 2000 survey) 
▪  The vast majority of contributors is involved in only one (Orbiten Free Software 
2000 survey) or very few projects (FLOSS 2002 survey). 
▪  The distribution of activity is highly skewed with respect to all activity measures 
(number of developers, downloads, site views, number of mailing  lists, etc.) and 
follows power-law-type distributions (Healy and Schussman, 2003; Hunt and 
Johnson, 2002). 
The results mentioned so far have been obtained either on the basis of on-line 
surveys (Orbiten Free Software 2000 survey; FLOSS 2002 survey) or on the basis of 
analysis of the Sourgeforce database (Healy and Schussman, 2003; Hunt and Johnson, 
2002). Empirical analyses that focus on single, rather large projects, confirm the results 
                                                 
23 To be fair, however, it should be mentioned that the metaphor of the bazaar was coined with reference 
to Linux, whereas these studies are based on analysis of the Sourgeforce database, which is the largest 
repository of F/OSS projects on the internet, but does not include data on the most successful projects 
such as Linux and Apache – that have their own websites – nor data on GNU projects – hosted on the 
Savannah website.  
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on the highly skewed distribution of development effort but emphasize the existence of 
a core team of developers that controls the development of the majority of the source 
code. Mockus, Fielding and Herbsleb (2002) study both the Apache web server and the 
Mozilla web browser, finding evidence of the existence of teams of 10 and 15 people 
respectively. In addition to this, they also find that the number of people who fix bugs is 
an order of magnitude larger than the size of the  core team, and the number of people 
who report bugs are an order of magnitude larger than those who fix them. Koch and 
Schnider (2002) explore the GNOME project, finding results similar to Mockus, 
Fielding and Herbsleb (2002), although contributions are more dispersed in their case 
study (52 developers account for 80% of the source code).   
To sum up, rather than as a “flat network of interacting peers”, the F/OSS 
community is best characterized as an aggregation of heterogeous contributors 
performing different roles. In addition to simple users that do not contribute in any 
direct way to a project’s development, at least three roles should be mentioned: 1) 
project leaders that constitute the “core group” of developers; 2) other developers who 
submit additions to the source code on a less regular basis; and 3) users of the OSS 
program that test the program, report bugs or simply submit suggestions.  
The existence of such role differentiation raises questions as regards to the extent of 
the division of labor in the context of F/OSS projects. One of the few contributions 
directly addressing the issue is von Kogh et al.’s (2003) study of joining behavior and 
contributions to the Freenet community. The study suggests that joiners tend to observe 
the development of the project for a while before actually starting to contribute and that 
newcomers derive benefits from specializing in their contributions. Moreover, only 
“core developers” who have significantly invested in learning about the complex 
software architecture are able to perform less-specialized tasks pertaining to the 
integration of modules. A different approach is taken by Dalle and David (2003), who 
explore the allocation of programming resources in F/OSS projects through a stochastic 
simulation model, based on the assumption that developers independently allocate their 
effort among project tasks and among different projects in order to maximize reputation 
benefits.  
The preceding synthesis of the empirical literature bearing on the characteristics of 
F/OSS projects was intended to provide two hints as regards to the issue of 
coordination. The first is that different projects require coordination to a different 
extent. The second is that, when coordination is a non-trivial problem (e.g. in cases 
different from the “cave-development” case) its solution should be considered less 
astonishing than first thoughts would suggest. It is indeed a rather different matter to 
consider the problem of coordination if the actual developers involved are in the order 
of magnitude of tens rather than hundreds
24. Nonetheless, understanding the way 
coordination is achieved in F/OSS projects is of crucial importance and it is surprising 
that a relatively little number of theoretical contributions have so far addressed the issue 
directly. 
The most common forms of coordination adopted in the context of F/OSS projects 
can be referred to as “benevolent disctatorship”, “rotating dictatorship” and “voting 
committee” system (Raymond, 1998b; Ljungberg, 2000). The most prominent example 
                                                 
24 Consider, however, that in the case of LINUX by July 2000 about 350 contributors were acknowledged 
in a credits list in the source code of the kernel (Moon and Sproull, 2000).   16
of the fist category is Linux. Linus Torvalds – the project founder – effectively “owns” 
the project, meaning that he is entitled to say the last word on the final design of the 
program. In the specific case of Linux, as the complexity and the number of 
contributors have grown over time, coordination of the project has become a task too 
demanding for a single decision-maker, and the model of coordination has evolved to 
include a number of trusted “lieutenants”, each responsible for a single subsystem and 
its interface with the rest of the project. As the status of project leader, also the status of 
“co-developer” with direct CVS access
25 is gained on the basis of merit and according 
to the rule “authority follows responsibility”(Raymond, 1998b).   
The adoption of a rotating dictatorship is a less widespread practice, but has 
nonetheless been used, for example in the development of Perl, a programming 
language used for a variety of programs, including the development of scripts for 
Apache web servers. Until 1996 a voting committee of co-developers was the 
coordination model adopted by a large project such as the Apache web server, in which 
decisions were taken on the basis of a system of e-mail voting based on minimal 
quorum consensus (Fielding, 1999).  
Whatever the specific organizational model adopted by different projects, what is 
important to note is that the anarchistic image of F/OSS development that has 
sometimes been suggested does not accurately capture the real nature of the 
phenomenon. Leadership and authority, however defined, are essential to the effective 
development of F/OSS projects. What remains to be satisfactorily explained is how 
leadership, authority and therefore coordination are sustained in a context of voluntary 
collaboration where none of the elements sustaining authority within firms are present. 
It is to this issue that we now turn.  
3.3.  How is coordination sustained? 
Leadership and authority are key to understanding how successful collaboration 
among widely distributed developers is achieved and how a major organizational 
challenge facing F/OSS projects – namely the possibility of “forking” – is overcome. 
“Forking” entails the release of multiple and concurrent versions of the source code, that 
would therefore tend to evolve in several and often incompatible directions. Forking has 
afflicted, for example, very popular programs such as the Berkeley Unix program, 
Sendmail at the end of the 1980s and more recently the GNU Emacs project. Given the 
terms of F/OSS licenses, that allow practically anyone to modify the freely available 
source code and redistribute it, it is rather surprising that the majority of F/OSS projects 
has not succumbed to forking.  
Raymond (1998b) provides an “insider” explanation of why this has been the case. 
In his essay “Homesteading the Noosphere” he elaborates on the reputation/gift culture 
argument introduced in “The Cathedral and the Bazaar” explaining the set of taboos, 
rules and informal institutions that characterize the hacker culture as functional to the 
“reputation game” that sustains the development of F/OSS software. He analogizes the 
customs and ownership rules of the hacker community to Lockean-style customs over 
land tenure. Ownership in the F/OSS domain relates to “the exclusive right, recognized 
                                                 
25 The “Concurrent Versioning System” is a software tool that performs two main functions: 1) store the 
project’s software code together with the documentation and written comments provided by developers; 
and 2) record changes made to the source code.    17
by the community at large, to re-distribute modified versions” (Raymond, 1998b). The 
Lockean-style ownership rules inadvertently but consistently adopted by F/OSS 
contributors represent means of maximizing reputation incentives. It is in this 
perspective that the three fundamental taboos of the hacker culture should be 
understood: (a) forking projects, (b) distributing changes to the projects without the 
cooperation of the moderators and (c) removing a person’s name from a project history, 
credits or maintainer list. Each of these behaviors reduces the effectiveness of the 
reputation mechanism by exposing the owner to reputation risks (a and b) and by 
unfairly denying to a member of the community a deserved reputational reward (c). 
In Raymond’s story authority is strictly linked to developers’ reputation. Note that 
authority is not to be intended as implying effective direction of the project, or the 
imposition to the community of a pre-defined “vision” of the development of the 
program. The notion of authority should be assimilated to some extent to Raymond’s 
conception of ownership and entails mainly a role of coordination and arbitration in 
case of technical disagreements. 
In cases in which the complexity of the project leads to a distribution of design 
authority and therefore partial property rights (as in the LINUX case), conflicts tend to 
be solved according to one of two rules: “authority follows responsibility” and 
“seniority wins”. In addition to this, a shared understanding of technical rationality that 
in general follows the standards set by Unix programming, constitutes an “objective” 
reference point for solving disputes concerning the opportunity to include alternative 
patches in the official release of a program (Raymond, 1998b; Weber, 2000).  
The enforcement of these rules ultimately depends on the active collaboration of 
community participants. The two principal sanctioning mechanisms available to the 
community of F/OSS developers are “flaming” and “shunning”. The first refers to the 
violent blaming of individuals for their taboo behavior, whereas the second has deeper 
consequences for the rule-breaker in that it entails a refusal of cooperation and therefore 
effective exclusion from the community. Of course the rule-breaker would still have 
access to the software itself, according to the terms of the F/OSS license, but he would 
be precluded from benefiting from the collaboration of other developers.   
It is important to note that the enforcement of community norms represents a 
second-order social dilemma, as punishment of rule-breakers is costly to the individuals 
who inflict the punishment but benefits the community at large, thus displaying the 
characteristics of a public good (Elster, 1989; Bowles and Gintis, 1998; Osterloch et al., 
2002). The literature on collective action (Ostrom, 1990) suggests that the successful 
solution of this social dilemma is a challenging task in virtual communities, because 
they lack clearly defined boundaries and a set of well-designed rules. Moreover, 
whereas monitoring of participants’ bahavior is made easier by the digital medium, 
punishment has to rely on informal sanctions only and therefore risks to be less 
effective than in territorial communities (Kollock and Smith, 1996). However, in the 
specific case of F/OSS communities, it is perhaps possible to speculate that Ostrom’s 
conditions are fulfilled to a greater extent than in other virtual communities, partly 
because the “hacker culture” provides a set of agreed-upon rules and partly because 
sanctions impose a concrete loss on the rule-breaker when they result in denial of access 
to the community’s pool of knowledge and experience.  
Few explanations other than Raymond’s “reputation game” argument have been put 
forward to explain the foundations of authority in the F/OSS community. Mateos-  18
Garcia and Steinmuller (2003) articulate an argument that is close to Raymond’s but 
places emphasis on the process of challenging the authority rather than stressing cultural 
norms as Raymond does. As projects grow in complexity – they argue –  authority tends 
to be challenged and distributed in the hands of an “inner circle” of developers, 
entailing a relative rise in the barriers to entry for outsiders. This sustains the orderly 
development of the program because prevents anyone who lacks authority from credibly 
threatening to fork the project, as their chances of attracting a significant number of 
contributors on the alternate development path are necessarily slight. 
Another hypothesis, advanced by McGowan (2002), is that a form of asset 
specificity may be part of the explanation for those projects that attract a high number of 
developers or directly challenge a dominant firm. McGowan adopts some of the insights 
of Hart and Moore’s theory of the employment relationship to suggest that 
“programmers will be more likely to accept hierarchy in projects that provide unique or 
unusually valuable returns”, similarly to employees in a firm, who are more willing to 
accept fiat power when their productivity depends on access to firm-specific assets.  
Interestingly, McGowan only considers the issue of specificity with respect to assets 
that in Hart and Moore’s theory are characterized as physical assets, e.g. the software 
code, and is therefore led to downsize the relevance of his argument by noting that 
“[t]he terms of the  open source license effectively preclude project maintainers from 
denying code to programmers, and programmers therefore could not be induced to 
accept hierarchy by the threat of being cut off from the relevant code”. However, 
McGowan’s intuition could be taken a step further by considering the other form of 
specificity relevant in the GHM
26 theory of the firm, namely the specificity of agents’ 
human capital with respect to the human capital of the other agents. From this 
perspective, programmers’ willingness to accept hierarchy would derive from the threat 
of being cut off from access to the other programmers’ human capital (tacit skills, 
knowledge and experience) rather than from the threat of being denied access to the 
source code. The argument would therefore be independent from assumptions 
concerning the desire to counter Microsoft’s commercial dominance and would only 
require an interest on the part of developers for peers’ advice, learning and exchange of 
ideas, which is consistent with the empirical evidence on motivation reported in section 
2.  
An alternative hypothesis put forward by McGowan on the basis of insights derived 
from Herbert Simon’s work is that identification with the goals of the community and 
loyalty towards it lead programmers to work actively to pursue such goals. Given that 
authority is used “to coordinate behavior by promulgating standards and rules of the 
road, thus allowing actors to form more stable expectations about the behavior of the 
environment (including the behavior of other actors)”(Simon, 1991), programmers will 
be willing to accept it as a means to an end. The implications of the sense of belonging 
and the notion of identity have only recently started attracting the attention of economic 
scholarship (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Indeed, this is an avenue worth pursuing in 
approaching F/OSS communities.  
 
                                                 
26 The expression “GHM theory of the firm” generally refers to the framework set up by the contributions 
by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995).    19
4.  F/OSS software in perspective 
This section aims at broadening the perspective on F/OSS software by looking at 
both competitive and cooperative relationships of F/OSS communities with commercial 
actors. The issue of the competition between open and closed forms of software 
production has been extensively addressed, especially with reference to the competition 
between Windows and Linux. The different forms in which interaction between F/OSS 
communities and commercial actors takes place have also attracted scholarly attention, 
in light of the increasing involvement of for-profit firms with the F/OSS phenomenon.   
4.1.  Competition with proprietary software 
The competitive relationship between open and closed forms of software provision 
has been analyzed along two principal dimensions: the relative quality of open vs. 
closed software products, especially in terms of the ability to meet consumers’ needs, 
and the dynamic of technological competition between open and closed software. 
Enthusiasm and skepticism seem to be equally abundant among the scholars who have 
tackled these issues. In what follows we will review the principal theoretical 
contributions on the two questions in turn.  
Kuan (2000) avows the superiority of the quality of F/OSS products, presenting both 
a theoretical model based on the idea of “consumer integration into production” and a 
statistical test of the rate of change of software quality based on software bugs data such 
as the life-expectancy of service request. In the model consumers decide whether to 
make their own software or to buy it from a commercial vendor. Closed source software 
provision entails information asymmetries, whereas F/OSS provision is exposed to the 
possibility of free riding. Thus, the result about the superiority of F/OSS software 
obtains provided that the free riding problem is overcome as all consumers decide to 
make their own software. 
User needs as drivers of contributions are crucial to the majority of models 
addressing the issue of F/OSS software quality. Johnson (2000) models F/OSS software 
development as the private provision of a public good. As in Kuan’s model, needs are 
homogeneous across agents, but valuations and abilities differ. Differently from Kuan, 
however, Johnson explicitly models the agents’ beliefs about the strategies of the other 
agents. He compares open and closed systems to a constrained social optimum and 
shows that F/OSS development will in general entail both an inefficient level and an 
inefficient distribution of development effort, due mainly to the possibility of free 
riding. At the same time, however, F/OSS development better exploits the talent pool 
made available by the Internet. A firm providing closed source software, on the other 
side, although unable to exploit such talent pool and to correctly assess the private 
valuations of users, will take into account the aggregate enjoyment consumers may 
derive from the program (see also Xu (2002) for a variant of Johnson’s model focusing 
on the effects of development costs on development effort and Bitzer and Shroder 
(2002) for a war-of-attrition model of the private provision of a public good). 
As Kuan’s and Johnson’s models, also Bessen’s (2002) model takes as a starting 
point the notion of user-driven innovation. Rather than focusing on the heterogeneity of 
consumers’ evaluations for a given software program, Bessen puts the emphasis on the 
heterogeneity of user needs and constructs a model in which the choice of the form of   20
provision of software is endogenous. Given the assumption on the heterogeneity of user 
needs, free riding is a less pressing concern, provided that the base product is created in 
the first place. This is mainly because the low probability that a specific feature will be 
developed by another consumer reduces the incentives to wait. In Bessen’s model the 
F/OSS form of provision is more efficient because it allows the complex and 
sophisticated needs of some consumers to be met in markets where incomplete contracts 
and asymmetric information prevent proprietary software from serving all applications. 
It is noteworthy that in both Johnson’s (2000) and Bessen’s (2002) models, the 
existence of a core group of developers that aggregate a sufficient amount of effort to 
provide a base code deeply affects the outcome of the model. This is consistent with 
both casual empiricism and self-reflection by advocates of the F/OSS community. 
Raymond (1998a), for instance, explicitly includes among the requirements for the 
“bazaar” mode of software production the availability of an initial base code, specifying 
that the bazaar mode is not suited to the provision of this initial amount of software 
code. The same observation is critical to models that capture the competitive dynamics 
of open vs. closed systems of software development through computer simulations, 
although in this case the existence of a core group of agents is relevant to the diffusion 
rather than to the production process.  
In Dalle and Jullien’s (1999) model of the diffusion of the Linux operating system, 
this aspect is captured though the introduction of individual adoption thresholds, 
dependent on idiosyncratic preferences for the dominant standard (in their analysis, 
Windows NT). As long as the parameter denoting such preferences is sufficiently low, a 
threshold effect may be set forth and F/OSS programs may overcome the existing 
proprietary standard. The competitiveness of F/OSS programs depends, however, also 
on the efficiency of its organizational structure (that benefits from adoption externalities 
to a greater extent than proprietary software) and on the degree of compatibility with 
existing proprietary solutions, so that the success of F/OSS should not be taken for 
granted. In particular, whereas simple reactions by commercial software producers 
(price reductions, increased R&D investments, changes in software distribution) may 
not be sufficient to contrast the path-dependent process of technological competition, 
hybridization strategies implying the adoption of F/OSS features may succeed as they 
modify the underlying preferences.  
Network effects and externalities are also at the heart of Bonaccorsi and Rossi’s 
model of the rivalry between F/OSS and proprietary software. Building on Marwell and 
Oliver’s theory of “critical mass”, the two authors build an agent-based simulation 
model in which the adoption of F/OSS software by a population of heterogeous agents 
is affected by its perceived intrinsic value, the negative network externality associated 
to the existence of an incumbent standard, the positive network externality associated to 
other agents’ use and development of F/OSS programs, and the intensity of the 
competitive reaction by the incumbent. Bonaccorsi and Rossi’s argument is similar in 
vein to Dalle and Jullien’s but leads to some extent to different results. Most notably, 
their simulations suggest that F/OSS and commercial software are likely to coexist, 
even in the limit. Even in a setting characterized by a biased distribution of beliefs in 
favour of F/OSS and no incumbent advantage, a strong competitive reaction by 
incumbent commercial players (for instance in the form of aggressive R&D spending) 
can put a brake or even block the diffusion of F/OSS software.   21
A different kind of strategic reaction by the incumbent software vendor (in terms of 
pricing, rather than R&D spending) and demand-side learning are at the heart of 
Casadeus-Masanell and Ghemawhat (2003) dynamic model of mixed-duopoly 
competition
27 between Windows and Linux. The main results of the model are that, 
depending on the speed of demand-side learning, either Windows and Linux coexist in 
the long run, or Windows pushes Linux out of the market. This occurs as long as 
Windows’ pricing decision is not myopic. By adopting a strategic pricing decisions, 
Microsoft can influence consumers’ valuations for its product at period t+1. However, 
the presence of cost asymmetries may overturn this result in favor of Linux.  
A starkly different approach in modeling the impact of F/OSS on commercial software 
markets is taken by Mustonen (2003) that attributes to  a monopolist’s wage policy the 
possibility to influence the occupational choices of programmers and the quality of both 
the proprietary and the F/OSS software program.  
4.2.  Cooperation with commercial actors 
The participation of commercial firms to F/OSS projects brings a number of benefits 
to the F/OSS community. Most obviously, it implies an enlargement of the user base 
and consequently an increase in popularity of the project , with the usual benefits in 
terms of network effects. The contribution of commercial actors is particularly relevant 
in that it can help to bridge the gap between technical and commercial software users. 
As mentioned in section 2, F/OSS developers tend to direct their contributions towards 
the solution of challenging programming tasks and to neglect those aspects of software 
development that, though less stimulating, are useful to less technically skilled users, 
such as for instance user-friendly interfaces. Collaboration with firms can thus provide 
financial incentives to target some effort in this direction (O’Mahoney, 2002).  
What are the motivations for firms to be active in the F/OSS world? The FLOSS 
survey (Wichmann, 2002a and 2002b) reports four motivations relevant to large firms: 
1) standardization; 2) use of F/OSS software as a low-cost component; 3) strategic 
considerations; and 4) enabling compatibility. The first motivation relates to the fact 
that F/OSS platform offers a specific advantage as a common standard because the 
license under which it is distributed effectively prevents any of the commercial 
developers adopting the standard from appropriating the software at a later point of 
time. The second motivation is easy to understand: the fact that F/OSS software is free 
makes it an ideal candidate for being offered to customers as part of a hardware-
software bundle to meet specific needs. Contributions to F/OSS software development 
may also be motivated by competitive goals, such as the desire to pose a threat to 
dominant firms in the market (3). Finally, firms might simply be interested in making 
their software or hardware compatible with F/OSS software and develop plug-ins 
necessary to do so (4).  
When attention is shifted to SMEs, the nature of motivations obviously changes 
considerably and becomes to many respect closer to the nature of individual extrinsic 
and social motivations (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003b).  User needs are among the main 
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drivers of contribution. The decision to contribute to the OS community software 
developed for the firm’s own need should not be too surprising, in light of the fact that a 
firm might face high transaction costs in trying to sell software developed for internal 
use if it is not related to his main area of business. Moreover, if the software is not key 
to the firm’s competitive advantage and making it freely available does not risk 
disclosing firm-specific information releasing the source code does not pose significant 
threats to the firm (Henkel, 2002).  
It should be emphasized that not all the firms, large and small, contribute back to the 
community. In the case of the Italian firms surveyed by Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003b), 
a comparison between individual and firms’ contribution shows evidence of a 
significant free-riding behavior on the part of firms
28. Indeed, firms join less projects 
than individual programmers do and they do not devote as much programming effort as 
individuals do to the projects they join. However, they also find that firms that 
participate in F/OSS development out of social motivations not only tend to display 
higher project membership and higher intensity of contribution in terms of lines of code, 
but also tend to have their contributions accepted into the official release of the project 
more frequently than firms motivated only be extrinsic motivations. 
The extent to which firms actively contribute to F/OSS development depends on the 
particular business model adopted. A comprehensive overview and evaluation of the 
business models that firms have elaborated so far is outside the scope of this paper
29. 
However, following Lerner and Tirole (2002) a rough distinction could be drawn 
between “reactive” and “proactive” strategies. The first kind of strategies entails a 
symbiotic relationship with an F/OSS project, with firms commercially providing 
complementary products and services that the F/OSS community fails to provide 
efficiently. This is the case of Red Hat, VA Linux or Caldera, who package the software 
in a user-friendly way and provide additional material such as manuals and support 
services. A more “proactive” strategy consists in a decision to release proprietary 
software code, generally with the aim of profiting from a complementary segment. The 
groundbreaking initiative in this regard can be safely identified in the decision by 
Netscape to release the source code for his web navigator (Mozilla) in 1998.   
Somewhere in between are hybrid business models – such as the one adopted by 
Sendmail Inc. – that lead firms to develop proprietary products complementary to 
F/OSS software products and sell them without contributing them back to the 
community (Ljungberg, 2002).  
One issue that has been largely overlooked in the literature concerns the long-term 
impact of the collaboration with commercial actors on developers’ incentives. More 
research could help to shed light on the risks that an increase in the number of agents 
that directly profit from F/OSS software might entail for the long-term survival of 
F/OSS communities norms. In addition to this, while scholars have so far focused either 
on competition or on cooperation between commercial actors and F/OSS communities, 
interesting insights could be gained by integrating the two aspects. Economic modeling 
could try to capture the strategic interests of commercial companies in supporting 
F/OSS software and how the symbiotic relationship between firms and F/OSS 
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communities affects the competitive relationship between F/OSS and closed source 
products.  
5.  F/OSS and Intellectual Property-related Issues 
 
Throughout the previous sections, a crucial aspect of the F/OSS phenomenon has 
been overlooked and hinted at from time to time with the purpose of undertaking a 
thorough discussion of it at a later stage. It is now time to explore in greater detail the 
basic institutional innovation at the heart of F/OSS projects (Frank and Jungwirth, 
2002), namely the adoption of a novel form of licensing. 
5.1.  Copyright, Copyleft and Open Source licenses 
The importance of F/OSS licenses cannot be overstated. F/OSS licenses play a 
crucial role with respect to all of the issues that have been addressed so far: the 
motivation of developers, the coordination of projects, the effectiveness of the F/OSS 
development model and the relationship with commercial firms. A quick look at the 
four most salient criteria contained in the OSD
30 immediately suggests why this is the 
case
31. The principle of Free Redistribution (“[t]he license may not restrict any party 
from selling or giving away the software […]”) ensures the viability of F/OSS business 
models. A second principle requires the availability of the source code, crucial to the 
functioning of the distributed development model together with the requirement that the 
license “allows modifications and derived works, and […] allows them to be distributed 
under the same terms as the license of the original software.” Finally, among the most 
relevant criteria for compliance with the OSD is the requirement concerning the 
integrity of the source code, essential to the process of reputation building emphasized 
in the previous sections.  
There is often some confusion concerning the question whether F/OSS software 
belongs to the public domain. Academic commentary has extensively addressed the 
issue (Gomulkiewitz, 1998; Lee, 1999; Perens, 1999; Lee, 2003; McGowan, 2001; 
Kennedy, 2001). F/OSS software is to be distinguished from software that is simply put 
into the public domain because, although it is freely available to all, developers do not 
surrender their rights to their software creations. Rather, they retain copyright over their 
work and adopt licenses to ensure free access and modification of the source code. As 
McGowan puts it, “[t]he licenses, and the GPL in particular, represent an elegant use 
of contractual terms and property rights to create social conditions in which software is 
produced on a model of openness rather than exclusion”.  In other words, “rather than 
diminishing the commons, the copyright in open source software protects the 
commons.” (McJohn 2000). Were F/OSS software to be in the public domain, everyone 
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could appropriate it, modify, even obtain copyright over it and remove the author’s 
name (Kennedy, 2001) and the structure of incentives that currently sustains F/OSS 
development would be jeopardized.  
The Open Source Definition is not itself a license in legal terms. It is “a 
specification of what is permissible in a software license for that software to be referred 
to as Open Source” (Perens, 1999). The first “open source license” – using the term a 
bit loosely – predates the OSD. Among the first F/OSS licenses is the GPL (General 
Public License), created by Richard Stallman, founder of the Free Software Foundation, 
and also called  copyleft, to hint  at the kind of rights creators grant to the public 
through the license. In the words of its creator: “Copyleft uses copyright law, but flips it 
over to serve the opposite of its usual purpose: instead of a means of privatising 
software, it becomes a means of keeping software free” (Stallman, 1999). The OSD was 
released only in 1998, partly with the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity associated to 
the term “free software” – hard to digest for potential commercial developers – and thus 
enhance the diffusion of the software beyond the borders of the original community of 
developers.  
The distinctive characteristic of copyleft licenses is that they are “viral”, as they 
impose that any derivative work that is distributed or published must be licensed as a 
whole under the terms of the same license (section 2(b) of the GPL license). The term 
“viral” is probably unfortunate and not entirely appropriate, as it has generated an 
“unreasonable fear of infection” (Rosen, 2001a) among commercial firms. It is not the 
mere use of GPL-ed software that generates an obligation to release one’s own software 
code under the GPL. The requirement of reciprocity only applies to works based on the 
program
32. 
Not all OSD-compliant licenses have a persistent nature. In fact, a taxonomy of 
OSD-compliant licenses can be build with reference to the way different licenses 
address the issue of derivative works (Kennedy, 2001), distinguishing among a) the 
GPL and LGPL (Library General Public License); b) the Berkeley Software 
Distribution (BSD), the MIT and Apache licenses; c) commercial licenses such as 
Mozilla Public License; and d) other open source licenses (see for instance Rosenberg, 
1998). The more permissive licenses in the taxonomy are those belonging to the b 
category: they do not impose any burden of reciprocity and allow the greatest freedom 
of distribution, modification and license change. The LGPL lies somewhere in between 
the GPL and category b, as it allows for license change if the software is bundled into 
new work. Commercial F/OSS licenses can be more or less restrictive as regards the 
issue of derivative works, but tend to impose some specific requirement different from 
the other licenses, such as for instance the imposition that ownership of any contribution 
should be attributed to the holder of the original license. As reported by Lerner and 
Tirole (2002b), the GPL license is, at present, the most widely used among the licenses 
complying with the OSD.  
Many commentators have analysed the choice of the appropriate kind of license for 
a business firm (Perens, 1999; Horne, 2001; Rosen, 2001b; Nadan, 2002; Oksanen and 
Valimaki, 2002; Stinebruner, Humphrey and Davis, 2002). Hawkins (2002) explores the 
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choice of a commercial firm between copyleft and non-copyleft licenses in a very 
simple model showing, among other things, that the a GPL license is never profitable if 
the possibility of competition with other firms is ignored, because  GPL licenses can 
only be used by a subset of the public that can use the non-viralGPL ones. Persistent 
licenses such as the GPL can be an optimal choice, however, when the presence of a 
market competitor that can adopt the product is considered. In the latter case, the 
persistent license forces the competitor to release changes.  
Lerner and Tirole (2002b) and Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003c) address the issue from 
an empirical perspective. The first two authors find that restrictive licenses are more 
likely to be adopted when the software is directed at end-users, whereas less restrictive 
licenses are more frequently adopted for projects geared to developers, the Internet, or 
proprietary operating systems. Bonaccorsi and Rossi (2003c) show that adoption of 
copyleft licenses is positively related to the strength of social and ideological 
motivations on the part of firms and to their degree of involvement into the F/OSS 
community. They also stress the fact that firms commonly recur to mixed forms of 
licensing. The possibility of dual licensing, i.e. releasing the software both under an 
F/OSS and a proprietary software license, has been also theoretically addressed (Rosen, 
2001b; Valimaki, 2003). 
F/OSS licenses raise a number of interesting legal issues. First, there is the question 
of enforceability. Of the very few legal suits involving F/OSS projects of which we are 
aware
33, none has been decided yet. However, legal scholars have usually argued in 
favour of the enforceability of F/OSS licenses under copyright law (Lee, 1999; Bobko, 
2000; Ravicher, 2000; Kennedy, 2001; McGowan, 2001; Jarvinen, 2002).  
A related question concerns the attribution of ownership rights and thus of the right 
to enforce the copyright and licensing terms (Kennedy, 2001). F/OSS software is the 
result of a process of distributed innovation, which opens up the possibility of 
distributed ownership. It is possible to envisage three scenarios (Oksanen and Valimaki, 
2002): a) bundled work and authorship: when the development process is uncoordinated 
and each developer retains rights to his own contribution; b) joint authorship: when 
development is centrally coordinated and each author has a copyright over the entire 
program; c) new authorship: when software is completely rewritten and the copyright-
holder is the author of the re-written software. To these possibilities a further 
complication should be added, namely the possibility that the developer’s employer 
obtains right to the software.  
One way out of this potentially confusing fragmentation of rights has been pursued 
by the Free Software Foundation and by other non-profit foundations operating in the 
F/OSS domain: encouraging developers to transfer copyright to the foundation so as to 
facilitate enforcement. This practice, together with the acquisition of trademarks and the 
active protection of projects’ brands, represents one of the strategies Siobhan 
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O’Mahoney (2003) has found to be adopted by F/OSS developers in order to “guard the 
commons”.  
Another legally controversial issue is whether the provision disclaiming warranties and 
limiting liability often contained in F/OSS license – entirely reasonable from the 
perspective of developers contributing to a public good – contrasts with national 
consumer protection laws (Jarvinen, 2002). The issue is particularly relevant in light of 
the expanding scope of participation of commercial firms to F/OSS projects. 
5.2.  F/OSS and the rationale for intellectual property protection of 
software 
The F/OSS phenomenon has been regarded by many authors as suggestive of the 
need for a radical rethinking of the current state of intellectual property protection for 
software programs (Moglen, 1999; Kogut and Methiu, 2001; Benkler, 2002; Bessen, 
2002; Osterloch et al., 2002; Karin, 2002). The argument advanced in this regard is 
generally twofold. On one side, it is emphasized that the success of the voluntary and 
distributed model of innovation that goes under the F/OSS label puts into question the 
traditional “market failure approach” to innovation, according to which exclusive rights 
to newly created knowledge are necessary to ensure appropriability of the benefits from 
innovative efforts. On the other side, attention has been cast on the possibility that the 
current system of intellectual property protection may pose a threat to the survival and 
further development of F/OSS software. This is the case in those countries, most 
notably the United States, where intellectual property protection has been stretched to 
encompass the use of software patents in addition to copyright and trade secrecy.  
The issue of the appropriate form of legal protection of software programs is, to 
some extent, an unresolved issue. As argued by Zimmerman (1999) and Jullien and 
Zimmermann (…) when copyright protection is applied to software, it is unable to 
provide an adequate balance for the two traditional objectives of intellectual property 
rights, namely providing incentives to innovation by restricting access to intellectual 
creations while at the same time encouraging the innovator to disclose his innovation so 
as to ensure diffusion. The inadequacy of copyright – that protects the expression of an 
idea, rather than the idea itself – is mainly due to the dual nature of software, that is 
information and technology at once, and to the fact that when the copyrighted software 
code is diffused in the form of object-code it is in fact not accessible. Indeed, the 
possibility to distribute software programs in binary form only implies that the most 
widely adopted form of protection for software programs is secrecy
34.  
However, recent court rulings in the United States have opened up the possibility of 
obtaining patent protection for software. As a result, hardware and software companies 
have engaged in a “dramatic patent ‘land grab’” (Bessen, 2002) that has made the 
number of software patents granted soar in recent years. The notion that patents are an 
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imperfect mechanism to encourage innovation is well-acknowledged in the literature
35. 
What makes their use even more problematic in the case of software is the nature of the 
innovation process that takes place in the software industry. Software products are 
complex products, and are the outcome of an innovation process that is both sequential 
and complementary (Bessen and Maskin, 2000). The sequential (or cumulative) nature 
of innovation bears upon the fact that each invention constitutes an input for subsequent 
innovative efforts. The complementarity of software innovations refers to at least two 
aspects: on one side, complementary pieces of software code are often combined to 
produce a complex and coherent product; on the other side, research efforts may be 
complementary in the sense that the activity of each developer, be it truly innovative or 
even imitative to some extent, exerts a positive externality on the other developers, 
increasing the overall probability of innovation.  
To be sure, software is not the only innovative domain with such characteristics. 
Kogut and Methiu (2001) mention for instance Heller and Eisenberg’s (1998) “tragedy 
of the anticommons” – the problem of excessive fragmentation of exclusive rights 
leading to under-utilization of knowledge – that has been first identified in the 
biomedical domain. What is peculiar about software – it is argued – is that it is a 
domain in which a spontaneous solution to the problem of inciting innovation has 
emerged in the form of the F/OSS mode of development.  
As mentioned, other authors have emphasized the threat that strengthened patent 
rights for software innovations may pose to the continued existence of the F/OSS 
production mode. Benkler (2002) urges to consider the loss of information generated 
through peer production as an additional cost that excessively strong intellectual 
property rights would impose on society. Patents increase the cost of using existing 
information, and thus negatively affect the working of production systems – such as 
F/OSS development – based on the free matching between information inputs and 
human capital.  
Threats to F/OSS projects may take a very concrete form. In particular, they may 
take the form of patent litigation, an increasingly important strategic tool in the hands of 
commercial companies
36. Bessen (2002) highlights some features of software patents 
and of the US patent system in general that may make matters worse for F/OSS 
developers. First, US courts have shown a tendency to lower the standard for non-
obviousness and to reinforce the presumption of validity. Second, software patents tend 
to be of a very poor quality, given the difficulty of assessing the existence of relevant 
prior art (see also Kahin, 2002). Third, software products are complex artifacts often 
made out of a large number of patentable components. These characteristics generate a 
situation that is prone to the emergence of “patent thickets”: large companies find it 
profitable to build large portfolios of patents that can be used both as an offensive and a 
defensive weapon. It is clear that unpaid F/OSS developers cannot afford to resist to 
patent infringement suits, let alone to directly engage in such strategic games. Although 
Bessen notes that the patent threat to F/OSS communities has not materialized so far, 
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the threat patents pose to software innovation more generally seem to be tangible 
enough to question the wisdom of keeping software patents in place
37.  
The F/OSS phenomenon thus suggests the need for additional research on the 
effects of the patent regime on innovative domains characterized by a strong degree of 
complementarity and cumulativeness. Such research is of special relevance in light of 
the debate surrounding the European Software Patents Directive.  
5.3.  F/OSS and interface standards 
F/OSS software also opens up issues at the intersection between intellectual 
property and competition law. In particular, attention has been devoted to the 
opportunity that F/OSS software offers to overcome the problems associated to software 
interoperability in a novel way (Zimmerman, 1999; Jullien and Zimmerman, …). Two 
notable characteristics of software products are the (positive) network  externalities that 
they engender and, relatedly, the role of interface standards. Network externalities may 
be both direct – when consumers’ utility is positively related to the overall number of 
consumers using a certain good – and indirect – when a large consumer base favors an 
increase in supply of complementary products. In the second case, the ability of 
consumers to benefit from greater availability of complementary products crucially 
depends on the compatibility among different applications and therefore on the 
specification of interfaces.  
Interoperability is ensured by the existence of standards. Zimmerman (1999) 
distinguishes among three kinds of solutions to the problem of interoperability: the 
existence of a dominant position that effectively imposes a standard based on 
proprietary interfaces; a standard de facto, emerging either in a decentralized fashion or 
as a result of the concerted effort of firms through a consortium or committee; a 
standard de jure, introduced through a concerted effort coordinated by a national or 
supra-national authority. According to Zimmerman (1999) and Jullien and Zimmerman 
(…) F/OSS development gives rise to a completely new approach to the problem of 
interoperability, as it generates a dynamic process of standards creation and evolution 
that has an entirely public character given the free availability of the source code. In 
particular, F/OSS software represents a valid alternative to the imposition of standards 
de jure – the so-called “normalisation”.  
 
6.  Government policies toward F/OSS software development 
 
Rather surprisingly, F/OSS software has swiftly found a place in the agenda of 
policymakers. Governments around the globe have considered the issue of providing 
direct or indirect support to F/OSS activities, turning F/OSS in a rather political issue. 
Countries as far apart as Germany, Brazil, Italy and Singapore, among others, have all 
endorsed F/OSS software to some extent, according a preference for adoption of F/OSS 
in governmental offices, offering temporary tax reductions and financial grants to fund 
Linux-related projects or though some other means (Hahn, 2002). In the face of such 
widespread positive acceptance of the F/OSS phenomenon by governments, a number 
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of authors has considered the economic rationale for direct or indirect public support to 
F/OSS projects.  
One line of argument proceeds by articulating the question “is the software market 
broken? If so, should we fix it by promoting F/OSS software?”. In other words, the 
rationale for public support of F/OSS software is pinned down to the existence of 
significant market failures in the software market (Evans and Reddy, 2002; Schmidt and 
Schnitzer, 2002; Comino and Manenti, 2003). A second line of argument bases the 
evaluation of the merits of public intervention on the comparison between F/OSS and 
proprietary software (Bessen, 2002; Evans and Reddy, 2002; Lessig, 2002; Schmidt and 
Schnitzer, 2002; Smith, 2002). The two perspectives are complementary, and often 
combined in a unitary approach, as for instance in Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002).  
The two authors list a number of potential sources of market failure and compare the 
relative advantages of F/OSS and proprietary software in mitigating these problems. 
Software markets possess three distinctive features: a) large economies of scale; b) 
crucial role of innovation; and c) network effects.  
F/OSS software enjoys an advantage relative to proprietary software only with 
respect to the first aspect. F/OSS software is priced at marginal cost, so that it 
maximizes static efficiency by ensuring the widest possible access to the software code 
once it is produced. On the contrary, the need for recouping fixed production costs 
induces commercial firms to charge prices above marginal costs and thus reduces 
access. The authors are less sanguine about the innovative potential of F/OSS projects. 
They emphasize, on one side, that the profit motive is likely to constitute an incentive to 
innovate stronger than whatever mix of incentives sustains F/OSS projects and, on the 
other side, that commercial companies have a greater incentive to tailor their products to 
the needs of the average costumer (this is a rather uncontroversial observation, on which 
all the other authors agree upon). Even less sanguine on this point are Evans and Reddy 
(2002), who insist on the fact that F/OSS projects have a predominantly imitative 
nature. As for the third feature, Schmidt and Schnitzer caution against the possibility 
that, in presence of strong network effects, government direct or indirect support for 
F/OSS software may tip the market in the direction of F/OSS software by influencing 
consumers’ expectations. Their Hotelling-like horizontally differentiated model of 
competition between an open-source product and a for-profit closed product shows that 
even when network effects are less pronounced, support to F/OSS software may have 
negative consequences: reduce competition, increase prices and lower both innovation 
and social welfare.  
Both Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002) and Evans and Reddy (2002) are skeptical about 
the opportunity of motivating public support of F/OSS on grounds of the existence of 
some sort of market failure in the software market. Comino and Manenti (2003), on the 
contrary, highlight the presence of a potential instance of market failure linked to the 
presence of a large fraction of users uninformed about the availability of F/OSS 
products. They conclude that government action devoted to removing this informational 
asymmetry enhances welfare, whereas direct subsidies to consumers of F/OSS products 
are always welfare-decreasing. A different instance of market failure is identified by 
Bessen (2002), who attributes to F/OSS software the merit of extending the market for 
software programs, limited by the combination of asymmetric information and 
contractual incompleteness (see section 4.2). However, the only form of government   30
intervention that Bessen recommends is the removal of a market failure the government 
itself has created by strengthening patent protection in the software domain.  
When the rationale for public support to F/OSS software is assessed with reference 
to the comparison between F/OSS and proprietary software, a commonly made 
assumption is that the government should act as any commercial actor and choose on 
the basis of objective quality, security and efficiency criteria (Bessen, 2002; Evans and 
Reddy, 2002; Hahn, 2002; Lessig, 2002). As in other contexts – it is argued – it is the 
market that should tilt the competition in favor of one product or the other. The 
differences among the various arguments largely rest upon the question whether 
governments should also take into account additional considerations when making their 
decision. Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002) and Evans and Reddy (2002) strongly favor the 
firm-like approach. Lessig (2002), on the contrary, while supporting the idea that 
governments should take a neutral stance towards open and proprietary software, argues 
that  “between two systems for producing a public good, one that releases the 
information produced by that good freely and one that does not, all things being equal, 
public policy should favor free access”. Moreover, he claims that the government has 
an interest in maintaining an open platform that should be factored in when considering 
the adoption of a platform for governmental agencies.  
Public support of F/OSS software may take many forms. The most commonly 
chosen option so far has been the mandatory adoption of F/OSS software in government 
offices. Direct subsidization has not fared as well as the first option in the real world, 
but is a theoretical possibility explored by Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002) with reference 
to the possibility of direct subsidization of developers and of institutions that coordinate 
F/OSS development, and by Comino and Manenti (2003) in relation to the subsidization 
of users. Finally, it has also been suggested that an effective form of government 
support of F/OSS software would be either a radical change in patent policy, namely the 
outright elimination of software patents (Bessen, 2002; Lessig, 2002), or a more 
moderate reform in the direction of stronger standards and shorter lives for patents 
(Evans, 2002). In sum, is seems reasonable to extract from the literature a case against 
direct government support of F/OSS software. 
A distinct issue is whether the government should allow and/or require publicly-funded 
software to be licensed under the terms of the GPL license. Schmidt and Schnitzer 
(2002), Smith (2002) and Evans and Reddy (2002) make a case against public funding 
of GPL-ed software on the basis of the fact that the “viral” nature of the GPL license 
would prevent some commercial companies from incorporating the GPL-ed software in 
their own innovations. Lessig (2002) concedes that this argument may have some merit 
on fairness grounds, but questions its relevance in terms of efficiency by noting that “it 
is not clear why the fact that [GPL licenses] would exclude some private companies 
from developing the software should, on its own, matter”. A stronger case in favor of 
adopting GPL licenses for publicly-funded software innovations is made by Aigrain 
(2002), who argues that GPL licenses best serve the aim of protecting the digital 
commons, especially by safeguarding from private appropriation those software tools 
that  “play a critical role as part of the common infrastructure of the information 
society”. Further investigation on the implications of the adoption of GPL vs. non-GPL 
licenses in terms of social welfare is surely needed.  
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7.  Conclusion 
 
F/OSS software is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon. Several theoretical 
and empirical studies have uncovered a number of aspects of this heterogeneity, 
showing that the nature of individual motivations as well as the extent of ideological 
commitment to the idea that software should be free differ across participants. Also, 
different projects are characterized by differing degrees of complexity and modularity, 
which in turn affects both the overall costs of coordination and the extent of hierarchical 
organization.  
However, the rapid proliferation of research activity on the subject has by no means 
exhausted the range of interesting issues opened up by this multifaceted phenomenon. 
There are good reasons to think that the best lesson to be learned from approaching the 
F/OSS world does not concern the question whether it constitutes a puzzle or not in 
light of economic theory, but resides in the opportunity it offers to question parochial 
methodological approaches. The real puzzle to be solved resides in explaining the 
multiple dimensions of the complementarity between not only individual motivations, 
but also between individual motivations and institutional factors such as the structure of 
social interaction and the nature of social norms. Indeed, it is to these aspects that the 
complexity and the ability of F/OSS projects to evolve over time should be attributed.  
The paper suggests some directions for further research. First, whereas the nature of 
the different types of individual incentives has been explored in sufficient detail, more 
could be done to provide an explanation of how the heterogeneous motivations guiding 
behavior of the different actors involved in F/OSS development integrate coherently. 
The issue is relevant in light of the fact that different motivations are likely to affect the 
choice of projects and the outcome of the development effort and thus the evolution of 
the F/OSS phenomenon.  
Second, few attempts have been made at explaining how authority and hierarchy are 
sustained in a context of voluntary collaboration where none of the elements sustaining 
authority within firms are present. An exploration of this issue could also lead us to 
conclude, as some have argued (Naidu, 2004), that what we observe in F/OSS project is 
actually not akin to hierarchy at all. Our understanding of the governance of F/OSS 
projects would also benefit from further exploration of the role of identity and the sense 
of belonging to the community of developers that, although empirically relevant, tend to 
be neglected in theoretical analyses of the F/OSS phenomenon. Moreover, the dynamic 
of enforcement of community norms and of punishment of rule-breakers also deserves 
further consideration. 
Third, it would be worth speculating on the long-term impact of the collaboration 
with commercial actors on developers’ incentives and the possibility that monetary 
compensation will crowd out individual incentives. More research could help to shed 
light on the risks that an increase in the number of agents that directly profit from 
F/OSS software might entail for the long-term survival of F/OSS communities norms. 
Also, economic modeling could try to capture the strategic interests of commercial 
companies in supporting F/OSS software and how the symbiotic relationship between 
firms and F/OSS communities affects the competitive relationship between F/OSS and 
closed source products.    32
Fourth, the issue of the choice between copyleft vs. non-copyleft licenses has been 
mainly analysed from the firm’s point of view. A question with strong implications for 
the public interest concerns the effects of widespread adoption of copyleft licenses in 
terms of social welfare. In particular, the issue of the kind of licence that should be 
adopted for publicly-funded software deserves further consideration. One could 
speculate for instance that encouraging the diffusion of copyleft licenses could be an 
alternative open to EU regulators faced with the question whether to extend 
patentability to software programs. The US decision in this direction may put European 
firms at a disadvantage, as they are exposed to the possibility of unintentional 
infringement of US patents. Instead of reacting by homogenising patent policies, an 
alternative option could be to encourage the adoption of copyleft licenses in order to 
create an area of free exchange of source code and increase the stock of “prior art” so as 
to hold back the relentless march towards knowledge privatisation.  
Finally, a better overall understanding of the F/OSS development model could shed 
light on the possibility to extend the model to other domains, so as to mitigate the 
effects of reliance on second-best incentive mechanisms such as the intellectual 
property system. Some proposals in this direction have already been made with regard 
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